Winning Appelate Brief in the First Annual Native American Law Student Association Moot Court Competition by Yeatman, Carol S.
American Indian Law Review
Volume 18 | Number 1
1-1-1993
Winning Appelate Brief in the First Annual Native
American Law Student Association Moot Court
Competition
Carol S. Yeatman
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr
Part of the Gaming Law Commons, and the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons
This Special Feature is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in American Indian Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact darinfox@ou.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carol S. Yeatman, Winning Appelate Brief in the First Annual Native American Law Student Association Moot Court Competition, 18 Am.
Indian L. Rev. 285 (1993),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol18/iss1/9
WINNING APPELLATE BRIEF IN THE FIRST ANNUAL
NATIVE AMERICAN LAW STUDENT ASSOCIATION
MOOT COURT COMPETITION
Carol S. Yeatman*
Questions Presented for Review
1. Whether Congress used unmistakably clear language in the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) to abrogate State's Eleventh
Amendment immunity by permitting only a tribe to sue a state, only
in a federal court?
2. Whether Congress has the power to abrogate State's Eleventh
Amendment immunity pursuant to its Indian legislation powers?
3. Whether the IGRA compels the states to negotiate or compels
them to compact with Indian tribes?
4. Whether Congress overstepped the limits of the federal power
by compelling states to negotiate with Indian tribes?
5. Whether the IGRA is rationally related to promoting tribal
sovereignty and its economic development?
Opinion Below
The Western District Court of Native Land ruled that the plaintiff's
cause of action against the state of Native Land was dismissed on the
basis that Congress did not have the power to abrogate State's Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause,
and that Congress exceeded its power when it coerced the states to
enter into compact with tribes for Class III games under the IGRA.
Jurisdiction
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has jurisdiction to hear this appeal on order granting motion
for leave to appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).
Statement of Facts
Plaintiff, the Sycamore Tribe, requested the State of Native Land
to enter into negotiations so that they may conduct Class III gaming,
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in accordance with the IGRA. The State's negotiator, Clint Custer,
did not negotiate in good faith, in violation of the IGRA. As the
IGRA requires, the Sycamore Tribe waited more than 180 days before
bringing this cause of action to enforce the good faith negotiation
provisions of the IGRA.
Summary of the Argument
The district court erred when it dismissed the Tribe's suit against
the State because Congress does have the constitutional power to
abrogate State's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The statute must use
clear language to abrogate and Congress must use a power that is at
least equal to that of the Fourteenth Amendment. The IGRA should
be upheld because it uses clear language to allow tribes to sue states
in federal court. Congress has the power to abrogate because when it
legislates for Indian affairs, its powers are so potent that it overrides
legislation enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. If the clauses requiring
state involvement are found unconstitutional, they should be severed,
which would allow Indian gaming to be regulated under a tribal-federal
agreement.
Argument
I. The District Court Erred in Granting State's Motion to Dismiss
Because the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) Constitutionally
Abrogates State's Immunity
Congress may override a state's constitutional immunity from suits
initiated in federal courts by using unmistakably clear language in
statutes enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause power. Pennsylvania
v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 15 (1988). The Union Gas dissent,
combined with a series of previous erratic decisions, are causing con-
siderable confusion within the federal district courts now deciding the
IGRA cases. The dissent, which is now the majority, would have found
that only the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to
abrogate the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity. In light of that
dissent and the district court's holding in the present case, this brief
will first clarify the abrogation doctrine. Next, this brief will establish
that Congress abrogated State's immunity when it enacted the IGRA
because the statute uses clear language and it was enacted with au-
thority that exceeds even that of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. Congress Can Abrogate State's Eleventh Amendment Immunity
by Using Unmistakable Clear Language in a Statute
The IGRA provides tribes a cause of action against states in clear
language. Generally, the Eleventh Amendment protects states from
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private cause of actions against them in federal court. This includes
suits brought by Indian tribes. However, this immunity can be abro-
gated by a statute's unmistakable clear language creating a private
cause of action against a state in federal.
The Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted to mean that the
judicial power of federal courts cannot decide suits against noncon-
senting states brought by anyone except sister states or the United
States. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1933). A recent
Supreme Court decision incudes Indian tribes among those citizens
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Blatchford v. Native Village of
Noatak, 111 S. Ct. 2578 (1991).
A series of Supreme Court decisions from 1964 to 1984 created the
current Eleventh Amendment doctrine. During this period, the Supreme
Court was often split on what was required to abrogate a state's
constitutional immunity. It all began in 1964, when injured employees
of a state owned railroad sued Alabama in federal court for damages.
Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184 (1964). The court found
that the state's immunity was abrogated because the statute expressly
applied to every interstate railroad with no exemption for state rail-
roads. Id. at 190. The Court also held that the state had consented:
it was implied by operating a railroad subject to federal regulation.
Id. at 192-96.
After Parden, employees of state institutions sued a state under a
federal statue that allowed any employer to be sued in any court.
Employees v. Missouri Public Health and Welfare of Missouri, 411
U.S. 279, 283 (1972). The court held that without clear language in
the statute, or the legislative history, allowing states to be sued in
federal court, they would not infer it. Id. at 285.
After Employees, a recipient of federal funds, dispensed by states,
sued a state in federal court for violation of federal guidelines. Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The court held that the state could
not be sued because the statute contained no provision for any suits
against anyone; nor did the state's participation in a federal program
constitute consent. Id. at 671-74.
After Edelman, state employees sued state officials in federal court
for discrimination in their retirement plan benefits. Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1975). This action was brought under the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, enacted pursuant to the Four-
teenth Amendment, which defined potentially liable persons as includ-
ing governments. Id. at 449. The statute also expressly permitted state
employees to sue in federal court. Id. at 449. In Fitzpatrick, the court
found what the previous cases lacked: statutory language of clear
congressional authorization for a private action against a state in
federal court. The court unanimously held that the unmistakable clear
language in the statute abrogated the state's immunity. Id. at 457. The
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1993
288 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
court based its holding on the belief that the fourteenth Anmendment,
by it own terms, specifically allowed Congress to limit state actions
by legislation. Id. at 453-54.
After Fitzpatrick, an employment applicant sued a state Hospital
in federal court for violation of a federal statute. Atascadero State
Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1984). The court held that the
statute did not contain unmistakably clear language that the plaintiff
was included in the any of those authorized to sue a state in federal
court. Ifd. at 245-47. Since the statute failed the clear language test,
the court looked further to determine if the state had waived its
immunity by consent. Id. at 240-41. The court held that the state's
constitution permitting the state to be sued "in such courts as shall
be directed by law" was not an unequivocal waiver to be sued in
federal court. Id. at 241.
After Atascadero, two important decisions defined the scope of the
unmistakably clear language test. In Welch v. Texas Highways and
Public Transportation, 483 U.S. 468 (1986), an injured state dock
worker sued the state under a federal statute. He argued that even if
the statute's broad provisions failed the clear language test, it met the
Parden test because the state was operating a dock under federal
regulation, like the state railroad in Parden. Id. at 476-77. The court
specifically overruled this part of its holding in Parden and replaced
it with the unmistakably clear language in the statute test. Id. at 478.
After Welch, the Court granted certiorari in Dellmuth v. Muth, 491
U.S. 223, 225 (1988),. to resolve conflicts in the circuit courts as to
how to apply the clear language test. A Court of Appeals had found
that the language of a statute combined with evidence in the legislative
history that states were liable, met the clear language test. Id. at 228.
The Supreme Court reversed, stating that the test was to be applied
only to the language in the statute, legislative history was irrelevant.
Id. at 230.
Decided on the same- day as Dellmuth, the Supreme Court, in
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 8-10, applied the clear lan-
guage test to a statute which specificaily included states within the
definition of persons who could be sued in federal court by private
parties. Id. at 7. The court held that this, language met the clear
language test to abrogate. Id. at 13. The dissent agreed on the clear
language, but argued that only the Fourteenth Amendment granted
the power to abrogate as they had held in Fitzpatrick. Id. at 41-42.
This dissent has now become the majority.
In summary, the Supreme Court will use only one test to determine
if Congress has abrogated state's constitutional immunity to be sued
in federal court by a private party. The test is certain: a statute must
create a private cause of action against a state in federal court by
using unmistakable clear language. In addition, a state can consent if
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it expresses an unequivocal waiver to be sued in federal court. The
Supreme Court requires that only one of the tests be satisfied.
B. The IGRA Properly Abrogates State's Eleventh Amendment
Immunity Because It Uses Unmistakably Clear Language
The district court erred by dismissing the Sycamore Tribe's suit
against the State because the IGRA, in unmistakably clear language,
permits a tribe to sue a state in federal court. Section 2710 (d)(7)(A)
provides that: "The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction
over any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the
failure of a State to enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe . .
or to conduct such negotiations in good faith." 25 U.S.C. §
2710(d)(7)(A). It is highly significant here, that only a state may be
sued, only a tribe is authorized to sue, and a federal court is the only
court authorized. By targeting states as the only entity that tribes may
sue, the IGRA is more specific than the statute in Union Gas, which
passed the test for only including states as one of many persons who
may be found liable by the broad category of private parties. Similarly,
by specifying that tribes may sue only states, the IGRA is more specific
than the language of the statute in Fitzpatrick, which passed the test
for only including governments among the many who could be liable.
Because section 2710 authorizes that only a tribe may sue only a state
in federal court, this unmistakably clear language abrogates State's
Eleventh Amendment immunity.
C. When Congress Enacts Indian Legislation, Its Powers Exceed
Other Constitutional Powers that Lawfully Abrogate State's
Immunity
The conflict in the district courts over whether Congress has the
power to abrogate State's immunity under the IGRA has not been
decided by a higher court. Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama,
784 F. Supp. 1549 (1992) (Congress does not have.the power to
abrogate); accord Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington, 790 F.
Supp. 1057 (1991); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 801 F. Supp.
655 (1992) (Congress does have the power to abrogate). This conflict
is resolved by comparing congressional power when legislating with
respect to Indian affairs with its Fourteenth Amendment powers. Recall
that the Supreme Court held that the power of Congress acting pur-
suant to the Fourteenth Amendment lawfully abrogates State's im-
munity. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. at 456. It follows that a
congressional power greater than its Fourteenth Amendment power
would also abrogate a state's immunity. The Supreme Court has held
that Congressional power when legislating for Indian affairs overrode
both a statute enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment powers,
No. 1] 289
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and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554-55 (1974).
The conflicting federal district courts assumed Congress was acting
pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause power alone but the IGRA
is silent on that issue. The courts are wrong. When Congress legislates
for Indian affairs, its power is not based solely on the Indian Com-
merce Clause. As the Supreme Court explained it in Morton v. Man-
carl, 417 U.S. at 551-55, the power of Congress when legislating Indian
affairs is plenary: it derives explicitly from the Constitution and im-
plicitly from tribal political status, the trust responsibility of the federal
government to the Indians, and treaty promises. As early as 1885, the
broad congressional power to legislate for Indian affairs was recognized
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375
(1885), as going beyond that authorized by the Constitution. Id. at
383-84. By 1903, the Supreme Court began calling this broad authority,
congressional plenary power. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553
(1903).
One element of the plenary power doctrine is the federal trust
responsibility toward Indians. Congress defines it as: The special re-
lationship between the United States and the Indian tribes and their
members and the Federal responsibility to Indian people." 25 U.S.C.S.
§ 1901 (Law. Co-op. 1988). The Supreme Court defines it as a "unique
legal relationship." Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 550. The Supreme
Court has held that the trust responsibility, standing alone, allows
tribes to sue the federal government if they breach the duty created
by the trust responsibility. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206
(1983). When the trust responsibility is combined with other authorities,
the power is so potent that it has forced states to protect the Indian's
share of the fishery resource within state boarders. Washington v.
Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 670-71 (1978).
Another element of the plenary power doctrine is a tribe's own
sovereign status, recognized by the Supreme Court in White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1979), as the tribal pre-
constitutional and inherent right of self-government. Tribal sovereignty
has been recognized by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Lee, 358
U.S. 217, 220 (1959), as powerful enough standing alone, to prohibit
states from interfering with a tribe's right to "make their own laws
and be ruled by them." Id. at 220. When the tribe's sovereign status
is combined with other congressional Indian powers, the resultant
legislation is so potent that the Supreme Court held that it overrode
both the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, and the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
at 551-55. The court explained that its holding was based upon the
plenary power of Congress which included the explicit authority granted
by the Constitution combined with the trust responsibility and tribal
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol18/iss1/9
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sovereignty. Id. at 552-54. Further, the statute in Morton, like the
IGRA, was enacted to promote tribal sovereignty and economic de-
velopment. Id. at 542.
Recall that the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 was
the same statute in Fitzpatrick that was unanimously held to abrogate
a state's immunity. Since Indian legislation overrides Fourteenth
Amendment legislation and the Due Process Clause, it logically follows
that congressional power acting pursuant to Indian legislation is greater
than its Fourteenth Amendment powers. Because Congress has the
power to abrogate a state's immunity under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, it certainly has the power to abrogate under its Indian powers.
In summary, the Supreme Court said in Fitzpatrick, that the Four-
teenth Amendment authorized Congress to abrogate State's immunity
because that authority is plenary and the Amendment, by its own
terms, "embodied significant limitations on state authority." Fitzpa-
trick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. at 456. Similarly, the Indian Commerce Clause
provides the identical limitations on state authority by granting only
Congress the power to legislate Indian affairs. But it is pointless to
analyze only the Indian Commerce Clause powers because this clause
has never stood alone before the Supreme Court and it should not in
this court. It is flanked on each side by the federal trust responsibility
toward Indians and the tribe's own sovereign powers. In combination,
those powers have been found to be potent enough to override legis-
lation enacted under Fourteenth Amendment power, which a unani-
mous Supreme Court held was powerful enough to abrogate the state's
constitutional immunity. Because Congress can override both the Four-
teenth and Fifth Amendment when it legislates for Indian affairs, the
congressional Indian power exceeds that of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Congress abrogated state's immunity under the IGRA because
it used unmistakable clear language in the statute and it was acting
pursuant to its Indian powers. Therefore, the district court erred in
dismissing the Sycamore Tribe's suit against the state of Native Land
and it must be reversed.
II. The District Court Erred in Granting State's Motion to Dismiss
Because Congress Did Not Compel States to Regulate
The district court erred when it granted State's motion to dismiss
on the grounds that Congress exceeded its power because it coerced
states to enter into compacts with tribes. If the court had properly
interpreted the Act's language and legislative history, applying the
requisite rules of statutory interpretation, it would have found that
the IGRA does not compel states to enter into a compact. Rather, the
IGRA only compels states to negotiate with tribes in - good faith.
Compelling states to negotiate is within congressional authority because
No. 1]
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it does not overstep the boundary between federal and state constitu-
tional powers. Moreover, the IGRA is a valid exercise of congressional
authority because it promotes tribal economic development by author-
izing tribes to conduct high stakes gambling activities to raise sorely
needed tribal revenues.
A. Using the Proper Rules of Statutory Interpretation Shows that
the IGRA Compels States to Negotiate, not to Compact
There are three rules of statutory interpretation that must be applied
in this case. First, before a court determines that a federal statute
impermissibly exceeds the outer limits of the federal constitutional
powers, as the Supreme Court ruled in New York v. United States,
112 S.Ct. 2408, 2425 (1992), a court must be certain of Congress'
intent by looking at the language and the legislative history of the
statute. Second, in deciding cases involving Indian tribes, courts must
interpret any ambiguities in a statute in a manner that is most favorable
to tribal interests. Blatchford v. Native of Noatak, 111 S. Ct. at 2589.
Third, a court must interpret the statute to avoid serious constitutional
problems "unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of
Congress." Id. at 2425. The IGRA's legislative history establishes that
Congress intended that this preferential rule be applied when courts
decide IGRA cases. See S. Rep. No. 100-446, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
15 (1988).
An examination of the language and legislative history of the IGRA
reveals that Congress intended to compel states to negotiate in good
faith, not to compact. Section 2710(d)(1)(A) specifies that a tribe may
conduct Class III gaming activities only after it successfully completes
negotiations with a state and develops a tribal-state compact. 25 U.S.C.
§ 2710(d)(1)(A). The Act requires a three step negotiation procedure.
First, a tribe wishing to conduct Class III gaming, "shall request the
State . . . to enter into negotiations . . . ." 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
Second., after a state receives such a request from a tribe, "the State
shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such
a compact." 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A). Third, a state and tribe may
enter into a compact after approval of the Secretary of Interior. 25
U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(B). This language draws a clear distinction between
a directive to negotiate and discretion for states to compact. This
interpretation is supported by the statement of Senator Reid during a
hearing to implement the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act:
The law seems so clear. It says, any state and any Indian
tribe may, may-we selected that language purposely-may.
It doesn't say shall, it doesn't say if you do not, you are
going to get sued. It just says any State and any Indian
Tribe may enter into a compact. I do not know how we
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol18/iss1/9
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could be more clear than saying may. I do not know of
another word we can use. Does anybody else?
See S. Hrg. No. 102-660, Pt. 2, 102nd. Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1992).
That a state is not compelled to enter into a compact is further
supported by Section 2710(d)(7), which authorizes a tribe to bring suit
against a state only if it refuses to "enter into negotiations" or does
not negotiate in good faith. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7). There is no similar
provision to sue a state who refuses to compact. This interpretation
comports with the Act's legislative history which establishes that tribes
must give up their legal right to conduct Class III gaming if "they
opt for a compact and, for whatever reason, a compact is not suc-
cessfully negotiated." See S. Rep. No. 100-466, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
14 (1988). Further, if a tribe does sue a state and the court finds that
the state failed to negotiate in good faith, section 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii)
authorizes a court to order the state and Indian tribe to conclude a
compact within sixty days. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii). If they do
not, a mediator picks the most suitable compact of those proposed,
submits it to the parties and waits for the state's consent. 25 U.S.C.
§ 2710(d)(B)(iv), (d)(B)(vi). If a state does not consent, the Secretary
of Interior and the tribe finalize the compact without further involve-
ment of the state, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(B)(vii).
The IGRA could plausibly be understood either as a series of
procedural steps which may result in a compact or as a mandate to
negotiate until at least a proposed compact results. The latter view
could be supported because Section 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) authorizes the
Secretary to bring "any cause of action" to enforce the procedures
prescribed when a state does not consent after the mediator has
submitted the most suitable compact. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii).
This may only mean that the Secretary is authorized to implement the
compact. It is somewhat ambiguous. However, any ambiguity must be
interpreted in a manner that is most favorable to tribal interests.
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 111 S. Ct. at 2589. The
interpretation most favorable to tribal interests, in this case, is one
that agrees with the language of the Act and its legislative history:
states are compelled only to negotiate in good faith, not to compact.
That states are not compelled to compact comports with the rule
that a statute must be interpreted to avoid serious constitutional prob-
lems unless it is contrary to the intent of Congress. The intent of
Congress, as shown above, is that states are compelled to negotiate.
This interpretation will avoid serious constitutional problems because
Congress may constitutionally require a state to negotiate. Moreover,
this court should not decide whether states can be compelled to com-
pact because that issue is not ripe since the Sycamore Tribe is presently
only enforcing the negotiation clause.
No. 1]
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In summary, there is no language in the Act or evidence in its
legislative history to indicate that a state is compelled to compact.
Thus, Congress did not intend to compel states to compact, but only
to negotiate. This conclusion requires an examination of whether
Congress may permissible require a state to negotiate.
B. Congress Has not Overstepped Its Constitutional Authority
Because Current Doctrine Prohibits It from Compelling States to
Regulate, But Not to Negotiate
No court has decided whether Congress can compel a state to
negotiate with an Indian tribe. This issue is resolved by application of
the recent Supreme Court test to determine the outer limits of federal
power with respect to the protection of state sovereignty. This will
establish that IGRA does not overstep the Constitutional division
between federal and state authorities.
The Constitution gives Congress. the authority to regulate in the
exercise of its delegated plenary powers, balanced by reserving non-
delegated powers to the states under the Tenth Amendment. Gregory
v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2399 (1991). This balance is destroyed
when Congress oversteps the outer limits of its authority. Id, at 2400.
The outer limits of federal authority are overstepped, as explained by
the Supreme Court in New York v. U.S., 112 S. Ct. at 2428, by
federal actions that order states to regulate for federal purposes,
inconsistent with the Constitution's division of authority. By contrast,
it is permissible for Congress to authorize states to implement and
enforce federal programs if states agree. Id. at 2428-29. Thus, Congress
exceeds the outer boundary of federal power only when it orders states
to regulate.
Because compelling states to negotiate is not an order to regulate,
it is not beyond the authority of Congress. To negotiate is defined as,
"to conduct communications or conferences with a view to reaching
a settlement or agreement." Black's Law Dictionary 934 (5th ed. 1979).
By contrast, to regulate is defined as, "to direct by rule or restriction."
Black's Law Dictionary 1156 (5th ed. 1979). The definitions draw a
distinction between compelling states to confer with tribes rather than
compelling states to enact rules. This distinction is supported by the
legislative history which shows that Congress intended that the state
may negotiate to implement their own regulatory systems as part of
the their compact agreement. See S. Rep. No. 100-466, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. 14 (1988). This view is also established by Section 2710(d)(3)(C),
which provides that a compact may include provisions relating to the
allocation of enforcement jurisdiction between the state and the Indian
tribe. 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (d)(3)(C)(ii). Legislative history shows that the
alternative of state regulation was permitted only after states expressed
concern that state law enforcement should outweigh tribal sovereign
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol18/iss1/9
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interests because states feared adverse economic impact on their gam-
bling enterprises and criminal infiltration into Indian gaming. See S.
Rep. No. 99-493, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-32 (1986).
In summary, Congress is not ordering states to regulate. Instead
the IGRA compels states to negotiate. Compelling states to negotiate
is not beyond the authority of Congress because it is not an order for
states to regulate. Rather, negotiation is designed to allow states and
tribes to resolve allocation of regulatory jurisdiction of Class III
gambling. Thus, Congress did not overstep the federal power by
compelling states to negotiate with tribes.
C. The IGRA is a Valid Exercise of Congressional Authority
Because Indian Gaming is Rationally Related to Tribal Sovereignty
and its Economic Development
The IGRA must be upheld as constitutional because it is rationally
related to Congress' trust responsibility toward Indians. The scope of
judicial review when determining if Indian legislation is a valid exercise
of congressional authority is limited to a rational basis test.
Federal legislation with respect to Indian affairs that can be "tied
rationally to the fulfillment of Coigress' unique obligation toward the
Indians" is a valid exercise of congressional authority and must be
upheld. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555. This unique obligation
towards the Indians is reflected in statutes and the strong federal policy
of promoting tribal sovereignty, self-sufficiency and economic devel-
opment. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143.
This obligation is even greater towards the tribes formed under the
Indian Reorganization Act (IRA). Id. at 138. This is true because the
explicit purpose of the IRA is "to rehabilitate the Indian's economic
life and to give him a chance to develop the initiative destroyed by a
century of oppression and paternalism." Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1804, 73rd Cong.,
2d Sess., 6 (1934)).
The purpose of the IGRA is "to provide... a means of promoting
tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal gov-
ernments." 25 U.S.C. § 2701(1). The legislative history shows that
many tribes such as the Sycamore Tribe, once impoverished from lack
of natural resources to develop and decreasing federal funds, have
become prosperous from revenues to generated by their gambling
enterprises. See S. Rep. No. 99-493, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1986).
Tribal gambling activities have decreased high unemployment rates and
the revenue support tribal government services such as schools and
medical clinics. See S. Rep. No. 99-493, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1986).
Because Indian gaming provides jobs for tribal members and the
revenue increases tribal government services, it promotes tribal sover-
eignty and economic development.
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In summary, because the IGRA provides the means for promoting
tribal sovereignty and tribal economic development, it rationally fulfills
Congress' obligation toward Indians and is a valid exercise of con-
gressional authority. Because the IGRA does not intrude upon state
sovereignty and is rationally related to Congress' obligation to Indians,
it is constitutional and must be upheld. Further, because the trust
responsibility and, therefore, the IGRA, extends to the Sycamore Tribe
since they were formed under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA),
they must be allowed to sue the State in federal court to enforce the
negotiation clause.
D. Even if Compelling States Is Unconstitutional, the Negotiation
and Compact Requirements May Be Severed
Even if the abrogation clause and the negotiation clause are not
found to be constitutional, they may be severed. An unconstitutional
provision can be severed, as explained in New York v. U.S., 112 S.Ct.,
at 2434, if what is left is fully operative as a law. The IGRA authorizes
severability. 25 U.S.C. § 2721. Because the IGRA was enacted to
provide a statutory basis for Indian Gaming to promote tribal economic
development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government, the state's
involvement would be unnecessary to accomplish the purpose of the
Act. Further, nothing in the Act prohibits exclusive tribal regulation
of Class III gaming except that such regulation cannot be "inconsistent
with, or less stringent than the State laws .... ." 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(5).
Severing would not interfere with the Act's purpose or the regulation
of Class III gaming activities and what is left is fully operative as a
law.
Conclusion
The district court's order granting the motion to dismiss the Syca-
more Tribe's suit should be reversed. If the negotiation-compact clauses
are found unconstitutional, they should be severed. If they are not
severed, it would constitute a fundamental injustice because otherwise
the Tribe cannot conduct Class III gaming allowed to other State
citizens nor does the Act permit them to sue in any other court.
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